War Looms

Something does not add up.

The meekness of sending the dossier to 180-odd countries; so many of the barbs from the Pak-establishment being ignored, or dealt laconically; too many high-level meetings involving the Services Chiefs; sending 2 Sukhois for retrofitting; the Army not responding to the Pakistani troop movements and loud warmongering, the PM mumbling out exceptionally harsh statements; the US interlocutors of all shades seen too frequently in the neighbourhood; the ambhibious INS Jalashwa and INS Viraat both patrolling the west coast.

All this cannot be for 'putting more pressure' to Pakistan to 'comply' with its promises. The signals are muddled and work against each other. The studied underplay, the meekness of 'crying out for help' does not fit with the medium-term planning of Sukhois and warships.

Can it be that India is preparing for a limited strike at defined targets inside Pakistan and POK? The planning points towards it. The timing need not be defined by the elections - the first intuition might suggest that things will move into top gear before April. However, traditionally political parties have been united in the matters of defence - as witnessed during the 1998 testing - when all the preparation was done during the Congress government, but the testing happened under Vajpayee.

The logistics of the strikes will need at least 6 months - given the winter and the lead time required to unleash the covert links on the targets. Indian government's reaction to another attack on Indian targets would be an interesting indicator. If it is raucous then maybe there is no planned strike. If it is muted and wreathed in silence, then war is afoot.

Despite what the US may try to sell as an argument, if push comes to shove, India will not listen to US concerns about Pakistani troops shifting to the east, abandoning the war on Taliban and Osama. The argument would be, 'you take care of your interests, we will take care of ours'.

If indeed there is war, however limited, the reasoning should be reconstructible. Let's attempt it.

First big concern: will Pak press the nuclear trigger? No. The MAD scenario will not be invoked. The Pak nuclear buttons are now split and secured (under Musharraf's insistence) and while they are bunkered in the western region (nearer the Islamist armies), they are safe from being taken over. Islamist sympathiser top brass have been purged from the army and the ISI has never shown an appetite for full-blown nuclear war. Besides this, the US Navy is keeping a close watch on the bunkers from the Arabian Sea.

Well, then in the situation of a low nuclear risk, India might think thus: there is no way that Pakistan will ever be reconciled to being India-neutral, not after Bangladesh. Any peace movement will always have periods of controlled warfare, either through terrorist strikes or Kargil-like incursions. In short, it will never be like France and Germany. The only reason Pakistan can give for its existence is if it leads to the dismemberment of India. Else it does not need to exist. Thus Pakistan will always seek India's dismemberment. If that is so, can India afford it? No. Not if it wants to be part of the global leadership. Simply because the setbacks caused by Pak strikes would never give it the legitimacy of a leader and it will always be seen as an economic risk by investors.

Containment is not going to help because, as we have seen, even a limited, once in a year strike can swing the sentiment away. Besides, instability in Kashmir and North-east, Telangana and Naxal-zones will not be options anymore. They will need to go.

Sooner or later, India will need to undertake this job of relieving Pakistan of its army, the ISI and hence, of its islamists. This cannot be done only though warfare. It can be done and sustained through building institutions, civilian rule, shared civilian-army control on the nuclear button and economic revival. All are long term factors.

Making Pakistan smaller is an active thought with India - it has succeeded before and hence may think that it can do it again. Separating Sindh (or parts of Sindh) will mean a lesser sized territory to handle. Balochistan could be next. In other words, its the Punjabi army and ISI that is the enemy; it is that which needs to be defeated. These are again long and strategic activities - we can see them slowly unfurling over the next 15 years.

But why is India planning to strike now? It can only be one thing - a rehearsal. India wants to test the waters before unleashing the grand plan. The brief incursion of Indian fighter jets can be explained only if we assume that it was done to check the scramble-times and the counter-strike readiness of Pak jets.

By doing a quick strike, say on a Lashkar camp and on JuD HQ, India will know the extent to which Pakistan will engage them militarily. Under the current economic conditions the world will stop Pakistan from a revenge strike. India has the advantage of not carrying a begging bowl. Far from it - it may be the only economic oasis in the free world in 2009 and 2010.

If this is the way then we will see a sustained effort from India to keep the post 26/11 situation warm. It will remove embassy staff, gradually withdraw from trade, cut air-links, shut roads. India will do so based on the timetable of the planned strikes. All this will be to ensure that the 26/11 situation is not allowed to cool despite conciliatory gestures (and even actions) by Pak.

So all portends to a grim 2009.